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Abstract:  
We investigate the incentive to provide goods of high quality in a vertically related market 
for different types of business organizations, a farmer-owned cooperative and an investor-
owned firm. Contrary to the firm, the cooperative is characterized by decentralized decision 
making, which gives rise to overproduction and problems coordinating the quality decisions 
of its members (free riding). Comparing both manufacturers acting as monopolists we show 
that the cooperative will never supply final goods of higher quality than the firm, and that the 
problem of quality coordination is mitigated if the cooperative succeeds in preventing 
overproduction. When a cooperative faces competition of an investor-owned firm (mixed 
duopoly), it will – except in one limit case – never produce final goods of a higher quality 
than the firm and will deliver lower quality in a number of scenarios.  
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Introduction 
Cooperatives and investor-owned firms are alternative forms of business organization that 
coexist and compete in many vertically related markets. Whereas the theoretical literature has 
identified a number of comparative advantages and disadvantages of cooperatives (Fulton, 
1995; Albaek and Schultz, 1998; Karantininis and Zago, 2001; Bogetoft, 2005), one 
characteristic of traditional cooperatives is that each member (upstream supplier; farmer) 
individually decides what to produce and deliver to the cooperative (downstream 
manufacturer). As the final product is (at least partly) determined by the quantity and quality 
of inputs, this decentralized decision making gives rise to the problem of coordination and 
free-riding: Although an individual farmer realizes that an increase in production or a 
reduction in quality reduces the price in the final market, he does not internalize the profit 
loss stemming from the price decrease incurred by the other members of the cooperative. The 
quantity coordination problem is a classical problem of cooperatives (Phillips, 1953), but also 
the problem of free-riding on product quality is well-recognized in the literature on 
cooperatives (see, among others, Cook, 1995, and Fulton, 1995). A coordination problem of 
this kind is absent for investor-owned firms, as they centrally decide about what is supplied to 
the market. 
Although competition between cooperatives and firms can be observed in many markets, 
theoretical findings on ownership structure and product quality are scarce. A number of 
authors, however, have investigated the quality choice in ‘pure’ duopolies with two investor-
owned firms. In pure duopolies it is a well-established result that the firm producing higher 
quality earns higher profits, irrespective whether producing higher quality increases fixed 
costs (Lehmann-Grube, 1997; Motta, 1993), variable costs (Motta, 1993) or does not 
influence costs at all (Choi and Shin, 1992). The decision which of the two rivals produces 
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higher quality products however is not of interest in these studies since the duopolists 
typically are assumed to be identical ex ante.  
Albaek and Schultz (1998) investigate the consequences of the free-riding behavior in a 
mixed duopoly setting, where a cooperative competes with an investor owned firm (but for 
homogenous goods only). The authors find that due to the decentralization of output 
decisions, cooperatives tend to overproduce. Interestingly, this negative externality turns out 
to be a comparative advantage of cooperatives in Cournot competition. Overproduction in the 
cooperative serves as a commitment device for credibly and profitably gaining market shares: 
‘… the results of this paper suggest that in the long run all farmers would be members of the 
cooperative’ (Albaek and Schultz, 1998: 401). 
Our paper is most closely related to the analysis of Hoffmann (2005), who is to our 
knowledge the first who investigates firms’ price and quality choices in mixed duopoly 
settings in a vertically related market with vertically differentiated products. Hoffmann 
endogenously derives the exact quality level, but decides exogenously, which organization 
produces higher quality. He shows that investor owned firms produce higher quality goods 
than cooperatives if producing high quality raises fixed costs, whereas the result is reversed 
in markets where producing high quality increases variable costs of production.1  
The present paper investigates this free-riding problem in determining quantity and quality 
within a marketing cooperative in a vertically related market. Upstream firms (farmers) 
deliver inputs to the downstream market, where a cooperative and / or an investor-owned 
firm use the components delivered to produce a composite good which is then sold to 
consumers. We compare a cooperative acting as a monopolist to an investor-owned firm as 
the only manufacturer and, in a second step, analyze a mixed duopoly market. In contrast to 
previous studies on quality competition in an oligopolistic market (Lehmann-Grube, 1997; 
                                                 
1 For a more comprehensive review on existing literature see e.g. Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2011). 
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Choi and Shin, 1992; Hoffmann, 2005) the decisions which manufacturer actually delivers 
the high quality product is endogenous here. In a monopolist setting we find that (i) even if 
the cooperative can control the quantity problem, the cooperative will never supply a final 
good of a higher quality than the firm. We further find that the quantity and the quality 
coordination problem are closely related and that (ii) if the cooperative faces a free-rider 
problem with respect to quantity, the quality coordination problem aggravates and the 
cooperative will certainly deliver products of lower quality than the firm in a number of 
scenarios. When a cooperative and an investor-owned firm compete in the downstream 
market (mixed duopoly setting), we find that (iii) in general the quality of the composite good 
of the firm will be at least as high as the product of the cooperative (and certainly of a higher 
quality in some scenarios) except (iv) if the quality of the final good is determined by the 
minimum quality of its components, where no clear results can be derived. 
In the next section we set up the model. The third section compares the quality decision of a 
firm and a cooperative acting as a monopolist, whereas section four considers a mixed 
duopoly setting. The last section concludes. 
The model 
To investigate the relationship between ownership structure and product quality, we follow 
Albaek and Schultz (1998) as well as Karantininis and Zago (2001) and consider a situation 
where there are two manufacturers and n farmers who sell through one or the other 
manufacturer. We call one manufacturer the cooperative (C) and the other the investor-owned 
firm, for short the firm (F). From the n farmers, nC deliver to the cooperative and nF to the 
firm ( CF nnn  ). If a farmer delivers to the cooperative, she has to decide whether to 
produce high or low quality and what quantity (q) to produce and to deliver. On the other 
hand, the decision-making process of the firm is centralized: the firm decides which quantity 
and which quality each farmer has to deliver to the firm.  
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The manufacturers use the components delivered from the farmers and produce a composite 
good which is then sold to consumers. The quantity (Q) and the quality (s) of the final 
product are solely determined by the quantity and the quality of the inputs. Each farmer’s 
product is associated with a number 0gis , },{ LHg   which represents its quality level.2 
To simplify notation, we normalize 1Lis , iHi ss 1  with 0is  exogenously given. 
Consumers’ preferences are formalized in the spirit of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and 
Tirole (1988). There is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly over the interval 
],1[    with unit density, where 1 . Each consumer either buys high quality, low quality 
or does not buy at all.3 The consumer indexed by the parameter ],1[~   maximizes the 
following utility function: 
 






                                          otherwise                    0
quality   low ofproduct  a buys he if          ~
quality high  ofproduct  a buys he if)1(~
~
L
H
p
ps
u 

  (1) 
All consumers prefer higher quality at a given price, but a consumer with higher ~  is willing 
to pay a higher mark-up for higher quality. The inverse demand functions for high and low 
quality are  
 sQQQp
HLHH )(    
 and (2)  
 LHL QQp   , 
                                                 
2 We use subscripts to denote organizational forms (C and F) and superscripts to identify the level of product 
quality (H and L). A subscript M in addition to the organizational form indicates that we analyze a manufacturer 
acting as a monopolist. 
3 The assumption that each consumer buys one unit of a good at most is unrealistic, especially in the context of 
food products. Most of the contributions on vertical differentiation use this restriction (see, e.g. Choi and Shin, 
1992; Lehman-Grube, 1997), even if they explicitly deal with the food industry as Hoffmann (2005). We 
recognize that this is a rather simplifying approach but maintain this assumption for the tractability of the model 
and for consistency with the literature on vertical product differentiation. 
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where HQ  and LQ  is the aggregate quantity of the high and low quality products 
respectively (see appendix A for a detailed derivation of the inverse demand functions).  
As the decision process is centralized for the firm, there is no doubt in assessing the product 
quality of the firm: All farmers supplying the firm either produce high or low quality. The 
quality of the final product of the cooperative is determined as the (weighted) average of the 
quality of inputs delivered by farmers. This assumption can be represented by a linear 
aggregation function for product quality:4 

Cn
i
g
ii s
1
 , where i  represents the weight attached 
to the quality of farmer i’s product delivered, with 

C
n
i
i
1
1  and 
C
i n
1 .5 As the members 
of the cooperative can choose different quality levels, the cooperative might end up 
producing a final good of ‘mixed quality’. Consumers perceive this mixed quality as high 
quality (and are therefore willing to pay pH) only if (i) the mixed quality maintains a certain 
‘threshold quality’ Ts  (therefore T
n
i
g
ii ss
C 
1
 , with HTL sss  ) and if (ii) there is no 
product of higher quality in the market.6 
This specification includes as a limit case that the quality of the manufacturers’ composite 
good is determined by the minimum of the quality levels of its components, )min( iss  , as 
                                                 
4 The linear aggregation function might be plausible in the case of wine production for example, where the 
quality of the wine depends on the quality of all grapes delivered. 
5 The assumption that the weights are 
Cn
1  for each member simplifies the analysis, as an individual farmer can 
affect aggregate quality only by changing her quality level and not by changing her output. With this assumption 
in place all farmers produce the same quantity, irrespective of their individual quality level (as quality affects 
only fixed, but not variable costs; see below), which serves as an ex-post justification for this assumption. 
However, without assuming equal weights each member can change aggregate quality by changing its output 
and firms might end up ‘trapped’ in an unfavourable situation where they do not produce the profit maximizing 
output for a given quality, but cannot adjust output as this would altering the aggregate quality which reduces 
profits even more strongly.  
6 These assumptions can be justified as most food products are experience goods, like – for example – wine: 
First, wine can be sold as ‘quality wine’ instead of ‘table wine’ if it exceeds a threshold quality level. Second, 
consumers often rely on wine guides assessing the quality of wine. As the rating (number of stars or points) is 
difficult to interpret, the ranking of products might be more important than the actual grade a wine receives. 
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proposed by Economides (1999).7 In this case the threshold quality is given by HT ss  . The 
consequences of the limit case will be briefly discussed after analyzing the general form of 
linear aggregation.8 
We assume that manufacturers have constant marginal costs which are normalized to zero. 
Farmers, on the other hand, have positive production costs. Producing high quality inputs is 
assumed more costly then producing low quality inputs: gfcqqc  2
2
1)(  with LH ff  . To 
simplify notation, we normalize 0Lf  and 0 ff H . The higher fixed costs for 
producing higher quality can be viewed as investment in new equipment or in professional 
training for the farmer, which is independent of the quantity produced. For a given product 
quality, all farmers have the same production technology.9  
Due to the ‘individualistic’ decision-making process of the cooperative, where each member 
decides how much and which quality to deliver, the cooperative has no control over what is 
actually supplied to the market. The extent to which the individual members of the 
cooperative coordinate their output decisions will be represented by a parameter 
i
j
q
q

  for 
ji  . We view  as the outcome of some unknown game, 1  would imply perfect 
coordination, 0  corresponds to Cournot behavior within the cooperative. The 
                                                 
7 Economides (1999: 903) motivates this assumption with the following example: ‚a long distance call requires 
the use of long distance lines as well as local lines at the two terminating points. The fidelity of sound in such a 
phone call is the minimum of the qualities of the three services used’. The probability of success of a complex 
process is given by the joint probability of success of all its parts. 
8 As a second limit case, the quality of the final product is determined by the highest quality of the inputs 
delivered, ݏ ൌ max	ሺݏ௜ሻ. In this case the threshold quality can be characterized as ݏ௅ ൏ ݏ் ൑ ∑ ௝߱ݏ௝௅௝ஷ௜ ൅ ߱௜ݏ௜ு. 
We will not discuss this special case any further, as it seems to be a quite unrealistic assumption when analyzing 
food production. 
9 Note that different assumptions concerning the cost of quality have been made in the literature so far. Here, we 
do not consider the cost of quality as a variable cost component which considerably simplifies the analysis. 
Assuming a change in product quality to influence variable costs introduces an additional interdependence 
between quantity and quality decisions of manufacturers. A detailed discussion of this issue is available in 
Hoffmann (2005). An interesting extension would also be to consider heterogeneous farmers and investigate, 
which type of farmer delivers to the cooperative and the firm respectively. Karantininis and Zago (2001) 
investigate this issue in more detail. 
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cooperative also retains no profit. Without free-riding on quality (which will be analyzed 
below), an individual members’ profit depends on the prices received (pH or pL), and is  
 gCC
gg
C fcqqp  22
1 . (3) 
The firm on the other hand is characterized by ‘centralized’ decision making. Following 
Albaek and Schultz (1998), we assume that the firm has a (perfect) contract with farmers 
specifying the quantity as well as the quality of their inputs. As the distribution of profits 
between farmers and the firm is not essential here, the firm’s behavior can be described as if 
it maximizes the vertically integrated profit of itself and its suppliers. In order to facilitate 
comparison with the behavior of the cooperative, we follow Albaek and Schultz (1998) in 
assuming that the vertically integrated profit is distributed among all farmers delivering to the 
firm.10 By assumption, there is thus no difference between the firm and the cooperative in our 
model with respect to the degree of vertical integration: the cooperative is vertically 
integrated and the firm acts as if it is vertically integrated. This allows us to focus on the 
implications of coordination in decision making for the provision of product quality. 
Depending on whether the firm supplies high or low quality, its problem is to maximize  
 gF
F
F
FF
gg
F fnn
QcnQp 



2
2
1  (4) 
with FFF qnQ  . Each individual farmer receives 
F
g
Fg
F n
 . 
It seems a very strong assumption that the firm can monitor the quality of its suppliers 
perfectly, whereas the cooperative cannot even offer incentives to encourage its members to 
produce high quality inputs and has therefore no control over the quality delivered by its 
upstream suppliers. We basically assume that the firm can control and enforce the quality of 
                                                 
10 An alternative would be to view the firm as acting in a Cournot duopsony. As long as farmers patronizing the 
firm are price takers, the firm will pay according to the farmers’ supply function (i.e. aggregate marginal costs). 
A detailed discussion of the effects of buyer market power of downstream manufacturers towards upstream 
firms (farmers) in a mixed duopoly is available in Tennbakk (1995). 
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its supplies better than the cooperative. Assume that the cooperative can control and enforce a 
certain quality level (and call this quality level sL), whereas the firm can monitor the quality 
supplied up to a higher quality level (sH). Both manufacturers can control quality levels 
below sL, and both cannot enforce qualities above sH. We simply focus on the quality levels 
between sL and sH, where the abilities of the firm and the cooperative with respect to 
monitoring and enforcing quality levels differ, and a mixed duopoly is therefore most 
interesting to analyze. 
The cooperative and the firm as monopolists 
In this section we analyze the behavior of the firm and the cooperative acting as monopolists, 
considering the situation of a profit maximizing firm first. Maximizing profits in (4) with 
respect to FQ  one can derive equilibrium profit levels for each farmer delivering to the firm 
when the firm produces high quality ( H MF , ) or low quality ( L MF , ) (see appendix B for output 
and profit equations). The firm decides to produce high quality if it is more profitable to do 
so, therefore if L MF
H
MF ,,   . Quality choices can be illustrated by means of an ‘isoprofit’ 
contour ( MFIP ,  in Figure 1), which represents all combinations of f and s for which 
L
MF
H
MF ,,   . 
 
< Figure 1 around here > 
 
If f = 0 and s = 0, there are no quality differences (neither in production costs nor in the 
consumers’ willingness to pay for quality), and so the isoprofit curve MFIP ,  originates in this 
point. As the costs of producing a high quality product relative to a low quality product (f) 
increase, the consumers’ willingness to pay for higher quality (s) also has to increase in order 
to guarantee each farmer the same level of profits (the isoprofit curves slope upwards, see 
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proposition 1 in appendix C). If, for a given s = s1, the additional costs for producing high 
quality (f) are large (f > f1), the firm will choose to supply low quality. Area A in Figure 1 
represents all combinations of f and s where the firm (as a monopolist) delivers low quality. 
The firm delivers high quality in areas B and C. 
When we compare this situation to a market in which a cooperative is the only manufacturer, 
we find two main results: 
Proposition (i): Even if the cooperative can control its quantity problem, the cooperative will 
never produce a composite good of higher quality than the firm. In situations where the firm 
produces low quality, the cooperative will also produce low quality, but when the firm opts 
for producing high quality products, the cooperative will deliver either high or low quality 
(we find two Nash equilibria). 
Proposition (ii): If the cooperative cannot control the quantity problem (perfectly), the quality 
coordination problem aggravates: The cooperative will never produce higher quality products 
than the firm and will certainly deliver products of lower quality in a number of scenarios.  
Decentralized decision making within the cooperative implies that each member (farmer) 
decides how much and which quality to deliver. The cooperative thus faces two (interrelated) 
coordination problems: a quantity and a quality control problem. The following payoff matrix 
(Table 1) illustrates the decision making process according to the quality of a member of the 
cooperative. The left column of the matrix describes the quality decision of the other 
members of the cooperative in contrast to the threshold quality. 
 
< Table 1 around here > 
 
11 
 
Note that consumers have a dichotomous perception of product quality: Without competition 
they perceive the product to be of high quality as long as it is good enough to pass a certain 
threshold quality level. In the first row of the payoff matrix the final product is perceived as a 
high quality product, even if member i produces low quality. In the third row the composite 
good is of low quality, even if member i delivers a high quality input. In both situations 
member i cannot alter the quality perceived by consumers and will produce low quality, 
which reduces production costs without altering the market price (  L MCL MC ,,   and  
H
MC
H
MC ,,   ). In these situations it is always more profitable for a single member to produce 
and deliver low quality inputs, as indicated by the arrows in Table 1. We therefore suggests 
the possibility of two Nash equilibria in the decision making within the cooperative: It is 
always an equilibrium that all members produce low quality. As long as HMC
L
MC ,,    this is 
the only equilibrium and producing low quality is the dominant strategy. It might be an 
equilibrium that the cooperative produces a quality level just good enough to be perceived as 
a high quality product. This is the case if L MC
H
MC ,,   . The indeterminacy of the equilibrium 
in the quality decisions within the cooperative however implies that the cooperative could 
also end up producing the low quality product even if producing high quality would generate 
higher profits for all members. 
We observe both a free-riding and a coordination problems: First, one member can produce 
low quality and still receive the market price for high quality products (free-riding problem). 
Second, in case when producing high quality products is more profitable for all members, the 
cooperative cannot ensure that the cooperative ends up producing high quality products 
(coordination problem). 
If the quality of the final product of the cooperative is determined by the lowest quality of 
inputs, the composite good will be of high quality only if all members decide to deliver high 
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quality. In this case Hii
ij
H
jj
HT ssss   

. Again all members producing low quality is 
always an equilibrium. If L MC
H
MC ,,    there exists a second equilibrium with all members 
producing high quality inputs. We again observe a coordination problem, as the cooperative 
cannot ensure producing high quality products, even if it is more profitable. However, free-
riding is absent in this limit case, as it is not possible for any member to produce low quality 
inputs and still receive the market price for high quality products. 
To investigate the factors influencing the profit of the cooperative when producing high or 
low quality ( H MC ,  and L MC , ), we maximizes profits in equation (3) with respect to gCq  (see 
again appendix B for equilibrium quantities and profits). Note that if quantity decisions are 
perfectly coordinated ( 1  ), output levels and profits for members of the cooperative and 
farmers delivering to the firm are identical ( g MF
g
MC qq ,,   and g MFg MC ,,   ). Controlling the 
quantity coordination problem implies that the isoprofit curve for the cooperative is identical 
to the isoprofit curve for the firm in Figure 1: 1,,
 MCMF IPIP . In area A the cooperative acts as 
the firm and delivers low quality, whereas we find two Nash equilibria in areas B and C: 
either all members produce low quality or the cooperative produces a mixed quality, just 
passing the threshold quality Ts  (see proposition (i)).  
If, however, quantity decisions within the cooperative are not perfectly coordinated ( 1 ), 
we find that the incentive to supply high quality for the cooperative is smaller, ceteris 
paribus. With imperfect quantity coordination, cooperative members tend to overproduce (
0


g
Cq ). As the aggregate quantity supplied to the market increases, the consumers 
willingness to pay for higher quality decreases,11 which reduces H MC ,  relative to L MC , . We 
                                                 
11 Note from equation (2) that  H L Hp p Q s    is a decreasing function of QH. 
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thus find that 1,,
 MCMF IPIP  (see proposition 2 in appendix C). Area B in Figure 1 represents 
all combinations of f and s, where the firm (as a monopolist) delivers high quality, whereas 
the product of the cooperative (as a monopolist) is of low quality. In area C we again have 
two Nash equilibria for decision making within the cooperative: ‘pure’ low quality or a mixed 
quality high enough to pass Ts  (see proposition (ii)). 
The results derived so far illustrate the quality coordination problem within the cooperative. 
Although the quality of products delivered by a cooperative can be the same as those 
produced by a profit maximizing firm, a cooperative will deliver lower quality in a number of 
scenarios. In contrast, there is no combination of parameters in this model where the 
cooperative would deliver higher quality than the firm. For the cooperative acting as a 
monopolist we observe a coordination problem, because even if L MC
H
MC ,,    we find two 
Nash-equilibria: The cooperative cannot ensure, that the quality of the final product will be 
high enough, although it is more profitable. Additionally, we observe a free-rider problem: 
Some farmers produce high quality to preserve the threshold requirement (to receive pH), 
while others free-ride, produce low quality and receive higher profits (as HMC
H
MC ,,   ). The 
results further suggest that the coordination problems with respect to quality and quantity 
within the cooperative are closely related. Improving the coordination problem with respect 
to quantity also helps to reduce the quality coordination problem. 
The results are similar if the quality of the final product is assumed to be determined by the 
minimum quality of the inputs. As the profit levels for a member of the cooperative ( H MC ,  
and L MC , ) are independent of the two different aggregation functions discussed, the isoprofit 
curves in Figure 1 do not change. The only difference is that the cooperative will produce 
‘pure’ high quality instead of mixed quality in the general case. Again we observe a 
coordination problem, because even if L MC
H
MC ,,    the cooperative cannot ensure that the 
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composite product will be of high quality. But we do not observe a free-rider problem in the 
classical sense: One member cannot benefit from the decision of the other members to 
produce high quality inputs (via a higher market price), without delivering high quality 
herself. 
The specific form in which the quality of inputs is aggregated is even more important in 
situations where the cooperative and the firm compete in the downstream market (mixed 
duopoly). 
The cooperative and the firm in a mixed duopoly 
Assume that the firm and the members of the cooperative play a two-stage game and decide 
on investment in quality in the first, and about quantities in the second stage of the game. 
Within each stage the firm and the members of the cooperatives have to decide 
simultaneously about quality and output levels. The optimal output decisions for the 
cooperative and the firm will depend on their own as well as their rival’s decision about 
product quality. Assuming Cournot behavior between the cooperative and the firm (
0CF
C F
qQ
q Q
    ) we solve the second stage of the game first. The optimal quantities (for 
given qualities) can be found by computing 0

C
g
C
q

 
from (1) and 0

F
g
F
Q
 from (2) and 
solving for gCq  and 
g
Fq . The corresponding levels of profits for the individual members of the 
cooperative as well as for the farmers supplying the firm for all combinations of quality 
levels are again summarized in appendix B. Table 2 illustrates the profits for the quality 
levels of the firm and the cooperative:12 
 
                                                 
12 In the following we denote the farmers’ profits with LL  and HH  when both manufacturers deliver low 
quality (superscript LL) or high quality (superscript HH). Farmers’ profits are L  ( H ) when they supply to a 
manufacturer whose product is of low (high) quality whereas the quality of the rival’s product is of high (low) 
quality. Note that HH is only possible if all members of the cooperative produce high quality and that if C=H 
and F=L the profits of those members of the cooperative, who free-ride and produce low quality increases by f. 
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< Table 2 around here > 
 
The choice of quality levels and the corresponding profits of individual farmers depend on 
parameters s and f, as well as on the number of firms nC and nF. To keep the following 
discussion as simple as possible and to focus on the quality decisions, we ignore the quantity 
coordination problem and assume 1 . Any difference in product quality between the 
cooperative and the firm are not caused by the well known ‘quantity control problem’ of the 
cooperative (described above for the monopoly case). We further restrict our attention to the 
‘closed membership’ case where each farmer has already decided whether to deliver to the 
firm or to the cooperative and for simplicity we assume 
2
nnn FC   to be exogenously 
given.13 
In contrast to the monopoly case discussed in the previous section each manufacturer now has 
to consider the quality decision of its rival in determining his optimal level of quality. Our 
main findings in a mixed duopoly setting are: 
Proposition (iii): In general the quality of the composite good of the firm will be at least as 
high as the product of the cooperative and certainly of a higher quality in some scenarios. 
Proposition (iv): If the quality of the final good is determined by the minimum quality of its 
components, we cannot derive clear results. We find scenarios where the firm produces 
higher quality or both manufacturers produce the same quality levels, but we also find 
scenarios where the cooperative ends up producing higher quality products than the firm. 
                                                 
13 The point here is to illustrate how differences in the degree of coordination in the decision making process as 
well as the way in which aggregate quality is produced from the inputs delivered result in differences in 
strategic behavior in the final market. The explanation of how the market division is determined in the first place 
is not an issue here, the implications of F Cn n  in a mixed duopoly will be briefly discussed in the final section 
of the paper. A detailed analysis of the implications of different access policies for financing and growth of an 
open-membership cooperative is available in Rey and Tirole (2007).  
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The interdependence in decision making as well as the equilibrium configuration of quality 
levels offered by the two manufacturers is shown in Figure 2.  
 
< Figure 2 around here > 
 
Figure 2 shows isoprofit contours for the firm and the cooperative for given parameters (n, 
, and c ). Assuming perfect coordination in output decisions within the cooperative implies 
that the firm and the cooperative deliver the same quantities as long as quality levels are 
identical. We thus find that LLF
LL
C   , HHFHHC   , LFLC   , and HFHC   . This implies 
that the isoprofit curves for the firm and the cooperative are identical: 11 CF IPIP   and 
22
CF IPIP  . 1FIP  and 1CIP  are the isoprofit curves for the firm and the cooperative respectively 
assuming that the rival delivers low quality, whereas 2FIP  and 
2
CIP  denote the corresponding 
isoprofit curves given that the rival delivers high quality. Note that 21 FF IPIP   and 21 CC IPIP  : 
the decision of the firm to produce high instead of low quality reduces the incentive of the 
cooperative to produce high quality too, and vice versa (for a formal analysis see proposition 
3 in appendix C). The two manufacturers have an incentive to differentiate vertically. It is 
well known from the results of ‘first-quality-then-price games’ (Shaked and Sutton, 1982) 
that vertical differentiation reduces the intensity of competition in the product market. 
The model suggests three different equilibrium configurations (areas A, B, and C): Both 
manufacturers will offer low quality products in area A. Area B represents combinations of f 
and s where the firm produces high and the cooperative delivers low quality. In area C the 
firm will again deliver high quality products whereas the cooperative offers either high or low 
quality. 
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The quality decisions in area A and area C of the firm are easily analyzed, as they do not 
depend on the cooperatives choice of quality: Area A represents all combinations of f and s 
where the firm will produce low quality, whether the cooperative delivers low quality (as we 
are above 1FIP ) or high quality products (as we are above 
2
FIP ). The firm will produce low 
quality in area C, as we are below both isoprofit curves 1FIP  and 
2
FIP . The dominant strategy 
for the members of the cooperative in area A is to produce low quality. In area C the 
cooperative faces a firm producing high quality goods in any case, but although profits are 
higher when producing high quality products we find two Nash-equilibria in the decision 
making process of the members of the cooperative: either all members produce low quality or 
all members deliver high quality inputs. As in the monopoly case, the cooperative cannot 
ensure that all members deliver high quality (quality coordination problem). 
In area B the decisions about quality are interdependent: the firm will choose to produce high 
quality, if the cooperative produces low quality (since we are below 1FIP ), but low quality, if 
the cooperative produces high quality goods (since we are above 2FIP ). The reason for this is, 
that the price increase, the firm can realize from producing high instead of low quality 
products, is smaller if the cooperative produces high quality already (see footnote 11). The 
cooperative’s decision in turn is illustrated in the following payoff matrix. 
 
< Table 3 around here > 
 
If the firm produces high quality (the situation described in the second payoff-matrix), the 
dominant strategy for the members of the cooperative is to produce low quality (as  LCLC   
and as we are above 2CIP , which implies 
L HH
C C  ). If, on the other hand, the firm offers low 
quality (the situation described in the first payoff-matrix), Table 3 suggests the existence of 
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two Nash-equilibria: Either all members produce low quality (as  LLCLLC  ) or the 
cooperative produces mixed quality (as we are below 1CIP , which implies 
LL
C
H
C   ). The 
cooperative will never produce a final product of ‘pure’ high quality, as some members can 
save production costs without altering the market price by producing low quality (free-riding 
problem, as HC
H
C   ).  
Both Nash-equilibria in the decision making process within the cooperative (producing low 
quality or producing mixed quality) turns out to be inconsistent with a Nash-equilibrium in 
the game between the firm and the cooperative: If the cooperative produces low quality, the 
firm will immediately switch to high quality (as we are below 1FIP  in area B). But how would 
the firm respond to the decision of the cooperative to supply ‘mixed quality’? Note, that a 
‘mixed quality’ of the cooperative implies that the firms’ product would be of higher (lower) 
quality than the cooperatives’ product if the firm decides to produce high (low) quality. The 
firm is indifferent between high and low quality if LF
H
F   . All combinations of f and s 
where LF
H
F    are represented by the isoprofit contour 3FIP  in Figure 2. Proposition 4 in 
appendix C shows that 13 FF IPIP  , which implies that it is always attractive for the firm to 
produce high quality if the cooperative delivers ‘mixed quality’. The firm producing high and 
the cooperative delivering low quality products is therefore the only remaining equilibrium in 
area B. In markets, where the average quality of the inputs determines the quality of the final 
product, the free-riding problem within the cooperative implies that the cooperative in our 
modeling framework will never deliver higher quality products than the firm, and certainly 
lower quality products in a number of scenarios (see proposition (iii)). 
Under the assumption that the quality of the composite good is determined by the lowest 
quality of inputs, the results for the areas A and C are identical to the previous analyses. For 
area B the analysis is different. If the firm produces low quality, there are two Nash-equilibria 
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within the cooperative: Either all members produce low quality inputs, or all members deliver 
high quality products. Producing high quality goods is also consistent with a Nash-
equilibrium in the game between the firm and the cooperative.  
When the quality is determined by the minimum quality, the cooperative still faces a 
coordination problem with respect to the quality of the inputs supplied by its members. But 
there is no possibility for any member to free-ride on the quality delivered by the other 
farmers: As soon as one farmer delivers inputs of low quality, the composite good is of a low 
quality (and each member receives the market price for the low quality product). This type of 
quality aggregation (aggregate quality is determined by the minimum quality of inputs) 
improves the situation for the cooperative, whereas it does not alter the firm directly, as the 
firm is not plagued by free-riding problems. The coordination problem of the cooperative 
alone is not strong enough to ensure that firms will always deliver a quality that is at least as 
high as the quality supplied by the cooperative (see proposition (iv)). 
The present model also includes the results derived in Albaek and Schultz (1998) as a special 
case. Ignoring differences in product quality, the quantity coordination problem of the 
cooperative turns out to be a comparative advantage and all farmers should become members 
of the cooperative in an open-membership equilibrium. Assuming 0s , 0f , and 0  
we find that the profit of cooperative members always exceed those of farmers delivering to 
the firm as long as 1Fn  (see proposition 5 in appendix C). The present analysis however 
suggests that the superior performance of cooperatives suggested in Albaek and Schultz will 
disappear in markets where consumers care about product quality ( 0s ). A deeper 
examination of an open membership setting in this case is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Conclusions and extensions 
The present paper investigates the incentives to supply high quality products in a vertically 
related industry. Quality choices of an investor-owned firm and a producer cooperative are 
20 
 
analyzed within a monopoly as well as a mixed duopoly framework. Assuming that the 
members of the cooperative independently decide about the quantity and the quality they 
deliver (decentralized decision making) there is a strong incentive to free-ride and to deliver 
high quantity and low quality (quantity and quality coordination problem). The investor-
owned firm on the other hand is characterized by a centralized decision making process and, 
by assumption, is not plagued by a coordination problem. 
Comparing the behavior of the two organisations (cooperative and firm) in a monopolistic 
market position we find that a cooperative will never produce higher quality than an investor-
owned firm, as the cooperative faces a quality coordination problem. The quality 
coordination problem gets even more severe if the members fail to coordinate their output 
decisions and therefore overproduce (free-riding on quantity). 
In a mixed duopoly setting the incentives for the competitors to supply higher-quality 
products depend on the way in which the quality of the final product is determined from the 
inputs delivered by upstream firms (farmers). In a general setting, where the quality of the 
final product is the average of the quality of inputs delivered by farmers, the free-riding 
problem is strong enough to ensure that the quality of the cooperative’s final product will 
never be above the quality of the firm’s composite good. In the special case that the quality of 
the manufacturers’ composite good is the minimum of the quality levels of its components, 
the free-riding problem is mitigated, as one member cannot receive the market price for high 
quality products without delivering high quality inputs himself. Despite the coordination 
problem, the cooperative’s product can be of higher quality than the product supplied by the 
firm.  
The theoretical analysis further suggests that the quantity and quality control problem within 
the cooperative are interrelated. Introducing measures to coordinate quantity decisions of 
members helps to mitigate the coordination and free-riding problem with respect to product 
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quality within the cooperative. In situations, where the quality of inputs supplied to the 
cooperative is more difficult to verify than the quantity delivered (in practice, the quality of 
inputs might be non-contractible between independent members of the cooperative), any 
attempt to coordinate quantities will be a suitable second best choice which indirectly also 
contributes to a higher level of product quality of the cooperative’s product. 
Whether the firm and the cooperative will offer high or low quality in equilibrium will also 
depend on factors which are not explicitly included in this model. It is well known that 
repeated interaction between members helps to achieve a cooperative outcome. The 
equilibrium outcome might be determined by the visibility of cheating (free-riding) and on 
the possibility of punishment. For example, Winfree and McCluskey (2005) show in an 
extension of Tirole’s (1996) model of collective reputation that there exists an incentive for a 
single firm to free-ride when the market price depends on the reputation of a producer group 
(or cooperative), which is based on past quality provided by the group. They show that in a 
repeated game the threat of punishment (by other members providing low quality) might be 
strong enough to achieve a sustainable equilibrium with high quality products. In addition, 
free-riding could be reduced if the cooperative improves in assessing the product quality of 
its members. Pouliot and Sumner (2008) show that an increase in the traceability to upstream 
suppliers (farmers) has positive effects on the quality (safety) of the raw materials provided. 
The results obtained further are likely to be sensitive to our assumptions about the 
specification of consumer preferences with respect to quality (Tirole, 1988:101) as well as on 
the assumptions concerning the cost of quality (Hoffmann, 2005). In addition, the extent to 
which the degree of competition between manufacturers influences the quality decisions in a 
mixed duopoly has not yet been investigated in detail.  
Finally, our results are derived under the assumption that the number of upstream firms 
(farmers) patronizing one of the two manufacturers is exogenously given (closed 
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membership). In contrast, an open-membership model would determine the share of farmers 
delivering to the cooperative and to the firm endogenously: this share will depend on the 
relative level of profits associated with supplying one of the two manufacturers. A detailed 
analysis of quantity and quality decisions in an open-membership model is beyond the scope 
of the present paper.14 Our result, however, that members of the cooperative tend to supply 
products of lower quality (and thus realize lower profits) causes doubts upon the finding of 
Albaek and Schultz (1998), who conclude that ‘in the long run all farmers would be members 
of the cooperative’ (Albaek and Schultz, 1998:401). Our model suggests that the profitability 
of cooperatives depends on consumers’ preferences for quality, as well as the way in which 
the aggregate quality is produced from the individual inputs delivered. These characteristics 
need not be identical for all products and might also differ between individual countries.15 
We hope that our paper will spur further theoretical and empirical research on the issue of 
product quality supplied by different organizations along these lines. 
 
 
  
                                                 
14 Following Tennbakk (1995), an additional option for those farmers patronising the firm would be to establish 
a second cooperative. Tennbakk (1995) discusses the implications of this strategy in the case of a duopoly 
model with homogenous products. 
15 As documented by Hansmann (1996) cooperatives figure prominently in some industries, such as agriculture, 
credit cards, electricity, and the financial sector. Focussing on the agri-food sector, Hendrikse (1998) finds 
substantial differences in the success of cooperatives between products and countries. While cooperatives have 
large market shares in some countries and some markets (e.g. milk production in Ireland) they are virtually non-
existent in other markets (e.g. beef production in Belgium or Greece). Within a particular country (e.g. 
Denmark), the market shares of cooperatives vary between 0 % (poultry and sugar beet) and 97 % (pork), and 
within a specific market (e.g. vegetables), market shares differ between 8 % (Ireland) and 90 % (Denmark). For 
the U.S.A., Cook (1995) observes that the market share of cooperatives in the market for milk production in the 
US increased steadily from 46 % in 1951 to 85 % in 1993. The market shares in other markets remained fairly 
stable (e.g. fruits and vegetables) or even declined slightly (e.g. livestock). 
23 
 
Appendix A 
The utility function of a consumer is characterized by equation (1): 
 






                                          otherwise                    0
quality   low ofproduct  a buys he if          ~
quality high  ofproduct  a buys he if)1(~
~
L
H
p
ps
u 

  (1) 
The consumer who is indifferent between buying a product of low quality and not buying at all is 
characterized by a parameter value  , and the consumer who is indifferent between buying a low or 
a high quality product is denoted by a parameter value of   , with  1 . The 
threshold quality levels with respect to prices are: 
LL pp  0  
and 
s
pppsp
LH
HL   )1(  
The producer of low quality products captures all consumers with   ~ and the producer of 
high quality products gets all consumers with   ~ .16 Assuming a uniform distribution of 
consumers over the interval ],1[    with unit density, the demand for low (QL) and high quality 
(QH) is: 
L
LH
L p
s
ppQ    
s
ppQ
LH
H    
Solving for pH and pL gives the inverse demand functions as stated in equation (2): 
 sQQQp
HLHH )(    
 and (2)  
LHL QQp     
                                                 
16  We assume that the indifferent consumer buys the product of higher quality, for convenience. 
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Appendix B 
The firm as a monopolist: 
Maximizing profits in equation (4) with respect to FQ  gives  snc
s
n
Q
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,
,

 for high 
quality and 
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,
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 for low quality products. The corresponding profit for each 
individual farmer is   fsnc
sH
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,
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2
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The cooperative as a monopolist: 
Maximizing profits in equation (3) with respect to gCq  which gives 
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The cooperative and the firm in a mixed duopoly: 
The corresponding levels of profits for the individual members of the cooperative as well as for the 
farmers supplying the firm for all combinations of quality levels are listed below. Note that we denote 
both manufacturers delivering the same quality with superscript LL (for low quality) and superscript 
HH (for high quality). One superscript indicates that we observe product differentiation with respect 
to product quality: The superscript L (H) denotes that this manufacturer produces low (high) quality 
whereas the quality of the rival’s product is of high (low) quality.
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Appendix C 
Proposition 1: 
The iso-profit contours ( 1 1 1 1 2 2 3, , ,, , , ,C M F M C M F C F C FIP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP
     ) slope upwards in the f/s 
space for 0s  , 1n  , and for  0,1  (for 1,C MIP ) and for 1   (for all other contours). 
2F C
nn n   for all iso-profit contours in the mixed duopoly setting (for the contours 
1 1 2 2 3, , , ,F C F C FIP IP IP IP IP ). 
Proof: 
We compute the relevant iso-profit contour by setting 0g gF C    and solving for f. We show that 
the derivative with respect to s is positive. 
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Proposition 2: 
If the quantity decisions within the cooperative (acting as a monopolist in the downstream market) are 
not perfectly coordinated ( 1  ) the incentive to produce high quality products declines.  
Proof: 
For 1   we have , ,F M C MIP IP . We need to show that , 0C MIP
   for 0s  and 1n . To 
compute ,C MIP , we set , , 0
H L
C M C M    and solve for f. This gives:  
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Proposition 3: 
In the mixed duopoly setting, it is always more profitable to switch to high quality if the rivalling 
manufacturer produces low quality, compared to a situation when the rivalling manufacturer produces 
high quality, as long as 0s  and 2n . 
Proof: 
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To show that 1 1 2 2F C F CIP IP IP IP    for 1  , 2C F
nn n   and 0s   we compute 1 2F FIP IP  (
1 2
C CIP IP  ) and show that this is positive. Using the levels of profits shown in Table 2 we set 
0H LLF F    and 0HH LF F    and solve for f which gives the equation for 1FIP  and 2FIP  as well as 
1 2
F FIP IP :  
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After rearranging we get: 
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Proposition 4: 
It is always profitable for the firm to produce high quality if the cooperative delivers ‘mixed quality’. 
Proof: 
We need to show that 3 1 1=  if 1F F CIP IP IP   , 2C F
nn n   and 0s  . To compute 3FIP  and 1FIP , we 
set 0H LF F    and 0H LLF F    from Table 2 and solve for f. This gives  
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Proposition 5: 
The profit of farmers delivering to the cooperative exceeds those patronising the firm if 0s  , 0f  , 
and 0   as long as nF > 1 (the result obtained in Albaek and Schultz, 1998).  
Proof: 
Profits of farmers from Table 2 simplify to      
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 0s  , 0f  , and 0  . From this we find that 
g g
C F   if nF > 1. 
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Table 1: Payoff matrix for members of the cooperative (monopolist) 
 (Quality perception of consumers in brackets; arrows denote strategies that are always more 
profitable) 
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H L 
All other 
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Table 2: Profits for individual farmers delivering to the cooperative or to the firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
              
 Cooperative 
Low Quality High Quality 
Low Quality 
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H
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L
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High Quality 
L
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H
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F  
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Table 3: Payoff matrix for members of the cooperative if the firm produces low quality and 
high quality 
(Quality perception of consumers in brackets; arrows denote strategies that are always more 
profitable) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Firm produces low quality 
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Firm produces high quality 
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L
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Figure 1: Isoprofit curves of the firm and the cooperative in a monopoly market 
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Figure 2: Isoprofit curves of the firm and the cooperative in a mixed duopoly 
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